

Clarifying the Cross-Class Support for Workplace Democracy

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Abstract

Workplace democracy has been advocated by capitalists, managers, and workers. This paper seeks to clarify such cross-class support by analyzing Americans' attitudes toward worker participation in decision making and worker control. National survey data from 1991 are employed. Hypotheses surrounding various criteria of class are tested and production-related conceptions are the most powerful predictors of these attitudes. The existence of significant cross-class support is confirmed. A path model is estimated for each class location in order to compare the underlying causal mechanisms. Non-working class support for workplace democracy is found primarily in subordinated class segments. Most importantly, "middle class" women are supportive as worker empowerment may improve their own lot. Overall, the advocacy by capital and its managers appears to merely reflect a veiled attempt to further their own agenda of capital accumulation.

Introduction

The workplace, the point of production itself, has been a central consideration in socialist thought. Transformations in the capitalist labor process and shopfloor relations have significant implications for the system of capitalism as a whole. Workplace democracy has been a major component of the Left's vision for over 150 years. In the past 30 years, elements of this vision have been co-opted by U.S. capital and its managers for their own class interests. Given this contradiction, a key research question is: who supports workplace democracy and why? More specifically, what are the class bases of attitudes toward workplace democracy?

In this paper the sociological literature surrounding the notion of class is reviewed vis-à-vis support for workplace democracy. National

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survey data are employed to explore Americans' attitudes toward worker participation in decision making and worker control. Hypotheses on a variety of class criteria are formulated to test which are the most salient bases of these attitudes. A more formal class location analysis illustrates that the cross-class support for workplace democracy is substantial. Class-specific path analyses clarify this contradictory support. Those who are subordinated within their respective classes are found to be most supportive. In the "middle classes," gender is salient. Within the working class, people of color, union members, and those who are dissatisfied with their jobs hold the most favorable attitudes toward workplace democracy.

This study makes a unique contribution to the empirical literature and has important implications for the theoretical literature. Workplace democracy is a complex subject whose relevance has recently increased given the globalization of the economy (Bachrach and Botwinick 1992; Howard 2000; Collom 2001b). If workers had more substantive voice in corporate governance, there would be less capital flight and the "race to the bottom" could be suppressed.

Literature review

Workplace Democracy

An extensive international literature exists on workplace democracy and its related concepts (i.e., economic democracy, co-determination, industrial democracy, self-management, worker control, worker participation, etc.). Like many others (e.g., Bernstein 1976; Greenberg 1986), "workplace democracy" is considered here as a general, catch-all phrase. In short, it is simply the idea that workers should have a voice at their jobs. This "voice" can vary considerably from token *involvement* to formalized *influence* to outright collective *control*. "Workplace democracy" best captures this notion as other concepts are even more vague or too narrow.

As a whole, the literature is extremely heterogeneous and contradictory. This disparity is rooted in the varied conceptions of "workplace democracy" and the varied advocates with differing interests and intentions (Heckscher 1980; Roca and Retour 1981; Rothschild 2000). Schiller (1991) identifies the "dual roots" of the concept:

Efforts to extend worker participation and control in Western Europe and North America are rooted in historical experience. Although such efforts have taken many forms in the past, they have generally arisen from one of two sources. The first is economic in nature and related to the question of how to structure efficient and competitive

economic enterprises. The second is political and has its origin in the revolutionary currents of the nineteenth-century labor movement (1991: 109).

Greenberg (1975) identifies four schools of thought behind the support for workplace democracy (see also Dachler and Wilpert 1978; Collom 2001a). The management school sees workplace democracy as a means of improving productivity and efficiency through increased worker satisfaction. The humanistic psychology school is concerned with the healthy development and growth of individual potential and thus has strong ethical grounds for advocating the alteration of work life. The democratic theory school argues that participatory decision making in all major social institutions is both necessary and proper. Finally, the participatory Left are the socialist advocates who see workplace democracy as overcoming worker alienation and developing the socialist consciousness necessary for revolutionary movements. The traditions of the democratic theory school and the participatory Left are credited with originating the concept (Greenberg 1986; Rothschild and Ollilainen 1999). As evident, “[m]easures promoting industrial and economic democracy in the United States lie along a continuum from the superficial and ephemeral to the fundamental and quasi-revolutionary” (Ivancic and Logue 1991: 216).

While worker ownership is frequently discussed and advocated, workplace democracy is primarily an issue of control over the means of production (Putterman 1990; Bachrach and Botwinick 1992; Archer 1995). Although employee stock ownership plans are widespread and often touted as “democratic,” they typically lack worker participation in decision making, preserving managerial control (Rooney 1988; Bachrach and Botwinick 1992). Transformations of the relations *in* production are often more substantive and empowering to workers than are transformations of the relations *of* production (Burawoy 1985). Genuine worker cooperatives do often transform both ownership and control relations, but are not widespread and are faced with contradictions in the milieu of the larger capitalist market (see Howard 2000).

Perhaps the best known form of workplace democracy in the U.S. is worker participation in decision making. Worker participation varies tremendously and it is useful to distinguish *participation* from *control*. As Bernstein (1976: 3) argues, “[w]orkers’ control usually implies full worker hegemony over the firm... (and) a permanent subordination of the rights of managers.” Witte (1980: 2) also distinguishes control from participation. He defines the former as “[t]he ability of an individual or group to determine unilaterally the outcomes of a decision-making process” and the latter as “[a]ctions by an individual or group that affect outcomes in a decision-making process.” Given these differences, it is fruitful to juxtapose worker control and worker participation as different

forms of workplace democracy. In this paper, Americans' attitudes toward both forms are investigated.

Theories of Class

Workplace democracy is, above all, an issue of class. Despite its widespread usage in sociology, class is perhaps the most inconsistently employed term in the discipline. Ossowski (1963) provides a useful distinction between *gradational* and *relational* notions of class. In the former, classes are seen as ranked on some dimension, forming a hierarchy. While class incumbents are higher and lower than others in this stratification system, the rankings do not reflect any inherent relationships between various classes. Relational conceptions, on the other hand, argue that classes are inherently derived from their relations to one another. Both gradational and relational notions of class are engaged as predictors of attitudes toward workplace democracy. Instead of attempting to untangle the more complex issue of cross-class support, hypotheses are formulated in a more straightforward fashion, assuming that workplace democracy is primarily in the interests of workers.

Income is the most common gradational notion of class (Kerbo 1991). According to the "underdog principle" (see Robinson and Bell 1978; Fenwick and Olson 1986), income should have a negative effect upon attitudes toward workplace democracy. Those with higher incomes benefit more from the existing organizational stratification system and are more likely to judge its inequalities as just. Conversely, those who earn less are likely to be unsatisfied with their workplaces and would favor the greater equality that democratic workplaces offer. However, there are reasons suggesting that income may have a positive effect upon these attitudes. Using Maslow's (1954) needs hierarchy, Inglehart (1977) argued that needs are pursued in a hierarchical order and that income (a materialist value) precedes participation (a post-materialist value). This suggests that only those with higher incomes will have satisfied their material needs, enabling them to be more supportive of post-materialist ones. Those who earn less should be predominantly concerned with the material realm. Nevertheless, the underdog principle is sided with here since workplace democracy offers the most hope for the most subordinated. Desires for good pay and participation are not necessarily conflictual and are unlikely to fall upon some needs continuum.

To further test these theories, indicators of wealth and poverty are also considered. Previous studies have shown that significant stock ownership has inconsistent effects upon attitudes toward workplace democracy (see below). Here it is expected that wealth will have a negative effect since substantive workplace democracy represents a significant challenge to the status quo—a challenge that might be seen as

threatening to the wealthy. Poverty is expected to have a positive effect. Those reliant upon governmental assistance, the “lumpenproletariat,” are most in need of worker-empowering reform.

Status, another gradational concept, is also a popular indicator of class location (see Warner 1949; Blau and Duncan 1967). While others engage the underdog principle to hypothesize the negative effect of status on attitudes toward workplace democracy (Fenwick and Olson 1986), there are other important theoretical reasons to expect a negative relationship. Those with higher status tend to adopt individualistic explanations for economic issues. Conversely, those with lower status tend to adopt structural explanations (Kluegel and Smith 1986). Such “system-blaters” are more likely to support workplace democracy as they see structures themselves as confining and problematic. Also, an implicit assumption is that structuralists are more likely to believe in the efficacy of workers since they do not blame them individually for their economic positions.

Weber’s (1946) market notion of class is the first relational definition that will be considered here. The primary class criteria that emerge from his approach are education and skills—the resources that individuals take with them on the job market. Previous research offers two theories of education which predict opposite results. It has been argued that education will be positively related to these attitudes since the more educated are more sophisticated and confident, making them more likely to believe in the efficacy of workplace democracy (Haas 1980). Yet the underdog principle predicts a negative relationship since those lowest in the organizational hierarchy have the most to gain (Fenwick and Olson 1986). Weber’s notion of class itself resonates with human capital theory. In this logic, those with more human capital (education and skills) are more likely to find a better job. This may quell the individual’s desire for workplace democracy since they may already have the autonomy and decision making power it affords. Given this logic and that of the underdog principle, both education and skills are expected to be negatively related to attitudes toward workplace democracy.

Occupation, the technical division of labor, is the most popular relational notion of class (see Parkin 1971; Goldthorpe 1980). Some have argued that blue-collar workers should be most supportive of workplace democracy since they tend to labor under the least desirable conditions (Haas 1980; Zipp, Luebke, and Landerman 1984). In addition to collar-color, occupational analysts usually bring in skill as well. Form (1985) found that the ideological differences between skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers were less than that between blue-collar and white-collar workers as a whole. Braverman’s (1974) work implies that

neither skill nor collar-color represent major divisions within the “degraded” working class. Nevertheless, the logic of these theories (and deprivation arguments in general) suggest that unskilled blue-collar workers will be the most supportive of workplace democracy while managers will be the least supportive. Alternatively, in his discussion of the “new class,” Gouldner (1979) argues that skilled white-collar workers should be the most supportive since they are more likely to already control the content and environment of their work. Nonetheless, the other theories coincide better with an assumption made in this paper—workplace democracy benefits the subordinated most.

The quintessential relational notion of class derives from Marx’s (1967) labor theory of value (see Harvey 1982). Here, property ownership defines the system of exploitation and is the sole source of capital’s ability to appropriate surplus value. Given capital’s necessity of controlling labor, they will *ostensibly* avoid any workplace reorganization that collectively empowers workers. Thus, property ownership is expected to be negatively related to attitudes toward workplace democracy.

Under capitalist society ownership takes on two basic forms. The distinction is critical, distinguishing between those business owners with employees versus those without. This identifies the petty bourgeoisie from the capitalists proper. The self-employed petty bourgeoisie have distinct class interests since they neither directly exploit labor nor is their own labor directly exploited by others (Wright 1997). Thus, workplace democracy is basically irrelevant to them. Given their support for the capitalist market and their generally conservative leanings, self-employment is expected to be negatively related to such attitudes.

Authority relations comprise another important relational notion of class (see Dahrendorf 1959). Authority and decision making power are indicators which distinguish managers and supervisors from workers. While lacking ownership, managers carry out the daily operations of the workplace on behalf of the bourgeoisie. As Zuboff (1988) notes, workplace democracy is a substantial challenge to managerial authority. Supervisors, in particular, may anticipate a loss of power (and perhaps their job) under democratic work regimes. Therefore, both supervisory authority and decision making power should be negatively related to attitudes toward workplace democracy.

Drawing from Braverman (1974), Wright (1978) introduced the salience of autonomy as a criterion of class location. Workers who have substantial autonomy over their daily work processes are similar to the petty bourgeoisie in many respects—they have freedom and represent a partial reunification of conception and execution. Workplace democracy

increases autonomy for workers as a whole. Those who currently have autonomy at their work may see such collective worker empowerment as threatening to their own individual empowerment. Moreover, those who currently lack autonomy are quite likely to want it and to see workplace democracy as a means of achieving it. For Blauner (1964), a lack of autonomy is “powerlessness,” a condition which workers resent. Nonetheless, Gouldner (1979) argues that those with autonomy treasure it as part of their identity and are therefore more likely to support workplace democracy. Kohn and Schooler’s (1969) work on occupational self-direction also suggests that the relationship between autonomy and attitudes toward workplace democracy should be positive. Again, the underdog approach is sided with here and autonomy is expected to be negatively related to support for workplace democracy.

Lastly, the effects of subjective class identification will be considered. While it does not fit neatly into Ossowski’s (1963) gradational versus relational scheme, some argue that class location is best determined subjectively (see Centers 1949; Vanneman and Cannon 1987). Those who identify as “working class” reject the socially desirable “middle class” identification and are more likely to be conscious of their subordination. Thus, subjective class identification is expected to be negatively related to attitudes toward workplace democracy with the “upper class” being least supportive. Table 1 labels and summarizes all of these hypotheses.

Table 1. Hypotheses of Class Effects on Workplace Democracy

<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Class Criteria</i>	<i>Relationship</i>
1	Income	–
2	Wealth	–
3	Poverty	+
4	Status	–
5	Education	–
6	Skills	–
7	Occupation: Unskilled Blue-Collar	+
8	Occupation: Managerial	–
9	Property	–
10	Self-Employment	–
11	Supervisory Authority	–
12	Decision Making Power	–
13	Autonomy	–
14	Subjective: Working Class	+
15	Subjective: Upper Class	–

Previous Research

Overall, there has been little previous research in respect to attitudes toward workplace democracy.¹ The research that does exist has limitations in respect to data and/or methodology. Nonetheless, there are some class-related findings which serve as useful points of comparison.

In the mid-1970s, blue-collar workers nationally (Zipp, Luebke, and Landerman 1984) and those in Indianapolis (Haas 1980) were found to be more supportive of workplace democracy than their white-collar counterparts. Yet other studies (Drago and Heywood 1989; Princeton Survey Research Associates 1994: 20-21) have found occupation to be an insignificant predictor of these attitudes. In 1987, members of Milwaukee households who received more than five percent of their income from stock returns were found to be more supportive of worker participation (Drago and Heywood 1989). However, stock ownership was found to negatively affect these attitudes in the 1975 national study (Zipp, Luebke, and Landerman 1984). In a 1977 national survey of workers, occupational status was found to have negative effects as those with lower status were more supportive of worker participation (Fenwick and Olson 1986). Education and income were tested in three of the five previous studies and these effects were consistently found to be insignificant. Level of skill and job autonomy were also reported to be insignificant predictors of attitudes toward worker participation in the 1977 national study (Fenwick and Olson 1986).

The inconsistencies in the previous research may reflect the disparities in the measurement of support for “workplace democracy.” The current project is a clear advance over the previous research in several respects. First, none of the previous studies focused on this puzzle of the cross-class support (and many of these data sets would not permit it since their population includes only workers). Second, there has been no attempt to systematically test different conceptions of class. Third, this study employs rigorous multivariate methods while several of the earlier efforts relied on simple bivariate comparisons. Finally, the data employed here are superior as they contain many items which tap into multiple forms of workplace democracy, the universe is national and includes all Americans in the population, and they were collected more recently.

Data and Methods

¹ This brief review focuses only on the comparable previous research—those studies which measure workplace democracy as a collective issue of control over the means of production. There are a few studies which consider ownership issues (see Employee Benefit Research Institute 1989) and individualistic (*personal* empowerment not *worker* empowerment) notions of participation (see Lawler III, Renwick, and Bullock 1981; Freeman and Rogers 1999).

The data employed here are the second U.S. wave of the Comparative Project on Class Structure and Class Consciousness (Hout, Wright, and Sanchez-Jankowski 1996; see Wright 1989).² This random-digit dialing telephone survey was administered in the 48 contiguous states in June-September 1991 to 2,488 English-speaking adults over 18 years old. It was fielded by the University of California-Berkeley Survey Research Center. This survey instrument is unique as it taps into job-level data of organizationally-based class relations, historical data of class biography and experience, and attitudinal data of political, class-related beliefs. As Wright (1989: 4) notes, “[t]he aspiration was to create a set of data which as rigorously as possible tried to operationalize and measure a range of core Marxian concepts.”

Several models will be estimated to determine the effects of class on attitudes toward worker participation in decision making and worker control. First, ordinary least squares regression models will be employed to test the hypotheses. Using the previous research and exploratory analyses, seven significant covariates were identified. These control variables include: age, gender, race, sector, job satisfaction, political identification, and union membership. Given the nature of this analysis, collinearity does pose significant problems. Therefore, stepwise procedures are employed to test the relative strength of each of the class predictors. First, all of the control variables are entered into the model. This ensures that the analysis will tap into the unique contribution that each class variable makes. Next, the 22 class variables and a multitude of two-way interaction terms are entered through stepwise procedures. The independent variables remaining in the model will be closely observed to determine whether there remains significant correlation amongst them.

After the class criteria regression analysis, the effects of class location are briefly analyzed. People do not experience class in separate bits and pieces, it is more holistic. The regression analysis suggests several important production-related bases of class which are combined to form six distinct class locations. A multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) model is employed to estimate the effects of class location on both dependent variables—worker participation and worker control. Estimated marginal (or adjusted) means and least squares differences tests are computed for each class location. This provides a substantive comparison of the effect of class location after removing the effects of the control variables.

The adjusted means analysis indicates that there is significant cross-class support for workplace democracy. This implies that the

² The first U.S. wave was administered in 1980 and was the basis of several books and numerous articles. Unfortunately, this first wave does not contain the battery of workplace democracy items.

underlying causal mechanisms may be operating differently for different classes. Therefore, a common model containing the control variables is estimated separately for each class location. A “stacked” path analysis model is most appropriate. Given their ability to handle intervening variables, path analyses better represent the complexity of the social world. This path analysis is theoretically driven in that only immutable, demographic characteristics (such as age, race, and gender) are considered as pure independent variables while the socially determined control variables (such as political identification and job satisfaction) are considered as intervening variables. Also, attitudes toward worker control (the more radical form of workplace democracy) are expected to be contingent upon attitudes toward worker participation. Thus, the relationship between the dependent variables is also investigated. The exact paths between the variables represent the best-fitting model which was determined in an exploratory fashion through the use of modification indices. Finally, after reviewing the stacked model for the individual class locations, a separate path model is estimated for workers that is theoretically salient for their particular class experience. Appendix A provides descriptions of all of the variables employed in the analyses as well as the descriptive statistics.³

Findings

Class Criteria Analysis

Table 2 provides the results of the regression models for attitudes toward worker participation in decision making. The first model includes six of the control variables. Given its class nature, the union variable did substantially affect the other variables (particularly in the case of worker control). Therefore, it is added into the last model so these interactions are clear.

³ Contact the author for copies of the correlation matrices.

Table 2. OLS Coefficients from Regression of Attitudes toward Worker Participation on Controls and Class Variables

	<u>Model 1</u>			<u>Model 2</u>			<u>Model 3</u>		
<i>Control Variables</i> (entered)	<i>b</i>	<i>(s.e.)</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>(s.e.)</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>(s.e.)</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Age	-.016 ^{***}	(.004)	-.107	-.016 ^{***}	(.004)	-.110	-.018 ^{***}	(.004)	-.121
Gender (women = 1)	.526 ^{***}	(.104)	.148	.373 ^{***}	(.105)	.106	.438 ^{***}	(.105)	.124
Race (minorities = 1)	.551 ^{***}	(.148)	.110	.539 ^{***}	(.147)	.107	.508 ^{***}	(.146)	.101
Sector (government/nonprofit = 1)	.234	(.122)	.057	.327 ^{**}	(.125)	.079	.234	(.126)	.057
Job Satisfaction	-.198 ^{***}	(.056)	-.104	-.201 ^{***}	(.057)	-.106	-.180 ^{***}	(.056)	-.095
Political Identification	-.160 ^{***}	(.042)	-.113	-.163 ^{***}	(.041)	-.115	-.159 ^{***}	(.041)	-.112
Union (member = 1)							.696 ^{***}	(.151)	.138
<i>Class Variables</i> (stepwise)									
Income				-.080 ^{***}	(.022)	-.110	-.085 ^{***}	(.022)	-.117
Petty Owner (self-employed = 1)				.525 ^{**}	(.205)	.078	.619 ^{**}	(.204)	.093
Owner (capitalist = 1)				-.686 ^{***}	(.201)	-.108	-.586 ^{**}	(.200)	-.093
Authority2 (sanctioning authority = 1)				-.363 ^{**}	(.124)	-.091	-.270 [*]	(.125)	-.067
Intercept	4.999 ^{***}	(.312)		5.613 ^{***}	(.326)		5.443 ^{***}	(.325)	
R square		.083			.138			.155	
N		1,086			1,045			1,045	

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05; two-tailed tests

As the first set of columns demonstrate, age is negatively related as older people tend to be less supportive of participation. The gender variable indicates that women are significantly more supportive of worker participation than men. Likewise, people of color are more supportive than whites. Sector produced insignificant results in this model. Those who are less satisfied with their jobs are more supportive. Finally, those who identify as conservatives have less favorable attitudes toward participation. The standardized coefficients indicate that gender has the strongest effect. Overall, these results make sense and coincide with the general underdog thesis that the subordinated and the dissatisfied will be most supportive.

As model 2 of Table 2 demonstrates, the stepwise regression resulted in only four significant class predictors. Income is negatively related as those who have higher household incomes are less supportive of participation. This supports Hypothesis 1 and the underdog, deprivation approach, casting doubt over the arguments of the post-materialists. The petty owner variable indicates that the self-employed are significantly more supportive than those who are not self-employed. Thus, Hypothesis 10 is clearly rejected. This support is peculiar since workplace democracy is basically irrelevant to the petty bourgeoisie. It appears that they either value their autonomy and decision making power enough to desire it to be spread to workers or that they are interpreting the questions in a way that includes their own employment situation. Capitalists, on the other hand, hold less favorable attitudes than non-owners, as Hypothesis 9 predicts. The latter have more interests in gaining participation while capitalists seek to retain their control over the workplace. As expected from Hypothesis 11, those who have sanctioning authority are also significantly less likely to support worker participation. As Appendix A demonstrates, the participation measure is based on attitudes about workers' participation in the election of the top directors and managers. These are the people who currently have sanctioning authority and they apparently do not feel that they should be elected by their workers.

The standardized estimates suggest that the income and ownership measures are the most powerful in predicting these attitudes. As Table 2 illustrates, the insertion of these class variables in the model made the control variable, sector, become significant. Those who work for the government or in non-profit organizations are more likely to support participation. As more of the variance in attitudes toward participation is explained by the class variables, sector becomes relevant in explaining the remainder. This counters the underdog approach which would expect private sector employees to be more supportive since they labor under the worse conditions. Haas (1980) explained a similar finding by noting that those who do not work in the private sector are

likely to be more humanistic since they are not continuously exposed to the “bottom line” mentality.

The third model includes the union variable amongst the controls. As evident, the sector effect becomes insignificant again. The standardized coefficients indicate that union membership is the strongest predictor. As union membership explains more of the variance, the effect of other variables are diminished (notice that both the owner and authority variables drop one significance level). Each model contributes to the total variance explained, but the R-square of model 3 is not very large, around 16% of the variance. However, this is typical in attitudinal analyses.

Table 3 provides the results of the regression models for attitudes toward worker control. The direction of the influence of the control variables are the same as in the participation models. However, there are differences in magnitude. Age is not significant. Gender, race, and political identification are less powerful predictors of attitudes toward worker control. Sector is significant and again, job satisfaction (the most powerful predictor) has a strong negative relation. The R-square of model 1 is clearly lower than that in the first participation model.

In the second model, the stepwise method for worker control also produced four significant predictors. The professional/technical variable has the most powerful relationship. These workers are more supportive of control than managers. Like the petty bourgeoisie, professional and technical workers are likely to already enjoy many of the fruits that workplace democracy bears to individuals (such as autonomy and decision making power). The model also indicates that skilled blue-collar workers support control to a greater extent than managers. While Hypothesis 8 (the negative effect of being a manager) is supported, Hypothesis 7 is rejected as unskilled blue-collar workers are not the most supportive. Given their capacities and possibly their unused potentialities, it appears that the skilled blue-collar workers are more likely to desire control over their workplaces.

As Hypothesis 11 predicts, both of the authority variables have significant negative relationships. Managers and supervisors apparently feel threatened by worker control. The insertion of these class variables into the model affected the influence of the control variables. Age became significant, gender became more relevant, job satisfaction became less relevant, and political identification became insignificant.

Table 3. OLS Coefficients from Regression of Attitudes toward Worker Control on Controls and Class Variables

	<u>Model 1</u>			<u>Model 2</u>			<u>Model 3</u>		
<i>Control Variables</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>(s.e.)</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>(s.e.)</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>(s.e.)</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Age	-.009	(.005)	-.053	-.012*	(.005)	-.066	-.011*	(.005)	-.065
Gender (women = 1)	.407**	(.129)	.095	.476***	(.140)	.111	.503***	(.140)	.117
Race (minorities = 1)	.521**	(.182)	.086	.564**	(.184)	.093	.492**	(.185)	.081
Sector (government/nonprofit = 1)	.455**	(.150)	.091	.421**	(.158)	.084	.258	(.160)	.052
Job Satisfaction	-.232***	(.069)	-.101	-.219**	(.070)	-.095	-.186**	(.070)	-.081
Political Identification	-.108*	(.051)	-.063	-.092	(.052)	-.053	-.095	(.052)	-.055
Union (member = 1)							.769***	(.189)	.126
<i>Class Variables</i>									
Professional/Technical (managers = 0)				.551***	(.171)	.103	.559***	(.171)	.104
Skilled Blue-Collar (managers = 0)				.489**	(.188)	.086	.392*	(.189)	.069
Authority2 (sanctioning authority = 1)				-.370*	(.149)	-.076	-	-	-
Authority1 (task authority = 1)				-.526*	(.251)	-.065	-	-	-
Income				-	-	-	-.055*	(.027)	-.062
Intercept	4.041***	(.384)		3.925***	(.403)		3.867***	(.421)	
R square		.046			.070			.080	
N		1,086			1,045			1,045	

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05; two-tailed tests

The effect of union membership is introduced in the last model and it affects the stepwise results considerably. First, both authority variables were dropped from the analysis. The significance of being a union member is more powerful and marginalizes the effect of not having any authority. As the authority variables were dropped, income entered the model. In accordance with Hypothesis 1, those with lower incomes are less supportive. As in the case for participation, sector becomes insignificant with the addition of the influence of union membership.

Overall, the majority of the hypotheses are rejected as only seven of the class predictors significantly impact attitudes toward workplace democracy (independent of the controls). Moreover, none of the interaction terms tested were significant. According to the collinearity statistics (not reported), correlation amongst the models' predictors is not a significant problem. These regression results are very useful as they estimate the relative salience of the various bases of class on these attitudes. It is essential to pinpoint the roots of such support since capitalists, managers, and workers have all advocated it. These findings suggest that the relational notions of class are much more relevant in explaining these attitudes. In particular, the production-related concepts are most important. This is sensible as these conceptions tap into production relations—the subject of transformation under workplace democracy. Gradational notions of class are not irrelevant however. Income proved to be important in respect to both participation and control.

Class Location Analysis

Now that the criteria of class that are significant determinants of these attitudes have been identified, it is possible to think more formally about class location. While it is important to test the effects of the individual bases, people experience these class dynamics *simultaneously* in their work lives. That is, not only do workers not own the means of production, but they also lack authority and autonomy. Bringing these features together provides a more accurate depiction of the impact of capitalism's class effects upon people's attitudes toward workplace democracy.⁴


With the exception of income, the significant class bases identified in Tables 2 and 3 combine nicely into a coherent production-centered notion of class. Similar to the work of Wright (1978; 1985; 1997), these criteria draw from both Marxian and Weberian notions. The

⁴ This is precisely the debate over class typology analysis versus class criteria analysis. The former argues for the simultaneous effects (see Wright 1993) while the latter argues for disaggregation (see Halaby and Weakliem 1993).

analysis suggests that there are six distinct class locations: capitalists, petty bourgeoisie, managers, supervisors, professionals, and workers (see Appendix A for information on the construction of the class location variable). Employing a MANCOVA model with the seven control variables, adjusted mean scores are computed for each class location on the participation and control measures. This class location approach provides the most substantive interpretation of the independent class effects as it taps into the simultaneous experience of class dynamics and provides easily comparable adjusted means.

Figure 1 provides the adjusted means results. The class locations are sorted according to the degree of support for worker participation. After the effects of the control variables, the petty bourgeoisie are the most supportive of worker participation. Indeed, they are significantly more supportive than the workers ($p < .001$). Workers are significantly more supportive than both managers and capitalists ($p < .01$). Professionals and supervisors occupy a middle ground. They are more supportive than managers ($p < .01$) and capitalists ($p < .001$), but do not differ statistically from workers or the petty bourgeoisie.

Figure 1. Adjusted Means for Class Location's Effect on Attitudes toward Worker Participation and Worker Control



Notes. Controlling for the effects of age, gender, race, sector, job satisfaction, political identification, and union membership; N = 1,086

The results for worker control differ considerably. Here, the class effect of being a professional is the most important in shaping these attitudes. The professionals' support is significantly greater than that of managers ($p < .001$), supervisors ($p < .001$), capitalists ($p < .01$), and workers ($p < .01$). Apart from the professionals, none of the other classes

are significantly different from one another in their attitudes. Thus, as the regression analyses suggested, class location has a very weak unique contribution in explaining attitudes toward worker control.

Overall, Figure 1 illustrates that the cross-class support for workplace democracy is substantial and that the workers are by no means the most supportive (as several of the theories of class predicted). Rather than speculate at this point about potential explanations for these findings, the causal effects of the control variables for each class location will be analyzed. It seems likely that these causal dynamics are operating in different fashions for different classes. Moreover, social reality is always more complex than multiple regression analyses assume.

Path Analyses


Several exploratory path models were tested until the “best-fit” was determined. Attitudes toward worker participation and worker control are included simultaneously in the model. Support for worker participation is likely to be a necessary, but not sufficient requirement of support for worker control. Participation is much less radical. The raw findings also suggest that this is a good assumption since overall, a large portion of the sample support participation while only a few are pro-worker control.⁵ Since income was found to be an important gradational class determinant of these attitudes, it is included along with political identification and job satisfaction as an intervening variable. Only immutable, demographic factors (age, race, and gender) are expected to be pure independent variables, unaffected by other factors.⁶

Figure 2 provides the structure and results of the best-fitting baseline model (that does not distinguish by class location). The model requires a correlation between the independent variables age and minority. The people of color in the sample are slightly younger than the whites. The intervening variables are not the center of this analysis, and as expected, have a very low percentage of their variance explained (1% for political identification, 2% for job satisfaction, and 3% for income). Nonetheless, the model demonstrates that older people are more likely to identify as conservatives and to be satisfied with their jobs. People of color and women are more likely than whites and men to have lower incomes.

⁵ This is evident from the mean scores of the two measures. Participation ranges from 0 to 6 and has a mean of 3.36. Control ranges from 0 to 10 and its mean is only 2.67 (see Appendix A).

⁶ Since the model will be estimated separately for each class location, two of the control variables were dropped from this analysis. Sector and union membership have no variance for some of the classes and are subsequently not included here.

Figure 2. Standardized Path Coefficients for Baseline Path Model of Determinants of Attitudes toward Workplace Democracy



GFI = .99; Chi-Square = 10.68; df = 13; prob. = 0.64; N = 1,055

Notes. Standardized path coefficients are located near the head of the arrows and the variance explained for each intervening and dependent variable is located outside of the upper-right hand corner of the boxes. All paths are significant ($p < .05$; two-tailed tests).

As found in the regression analyses, age, political identification, job satisfaction, and income all have negative effects on attitudes toward worker participation. Job satisfaction is also negatively related to worker control. Women and people of color are more supportive of both participation and control. The unique contribution of this model is worker participation's effect upon attitudes toward worker control. As evident from the standardized coefficient (.30), this is by far the strongest relationship in the model. Those who support participation are more likely to support control. Overall, this model explains 10% of the variance in attitudes toward worker participation and 12% of the variance in attitudes toward worker control.

In order to identify the underlying bases of different class incumbent's support for workplace democracy, this path model is estimated for each of the six classes. Table 4 provides the significant ($p < .05$) standardized path coefficients for this "stacked" model. The first cell in the table indicates that older workers are more likely to identify themselves as conservatives. Age did not have a significant relationship to political identification for any of the other classes.

Table 4. Standardized Path Coefficients for Stacked Class Location Path Models (Significant Relations Only)

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<u>Political Identification</u> Workers: .140**	<u>Job Satisfaction</u> Managers: .168** Workers: .155**	<u>Income</u> -	<u>Participation</u> Capitalists: -.262**	<u>Control</u> -
Race (minorities = 1)	-. ^a	-	PettyBourg: -.295** Managers: -.140*	Workers: .113*	Professionals: .257**
Gender (women = 1)	-	-	Workers: -.115*	PettyBourg: .256* Managers: .260***	Supervisors: .253* Professionals: .272**
Political Identification	-	-	-	Managers: -.111* Professionals: -.377***	-
Job Satisfaction	-	-	-	Workers: -.151**	Workers: -.110*
Income	-	-	-	Capitalists: -.225* Managers: -.121*	-
Participation	-	-	-	-	Capitalists: .327** PettyBourg: .428*** Managers: .360*** Professionals: .225** Workers: .269***
<i>R-square</i>					
Capitalists (N = 89)	.009	.018	.048	.181	.122
Petty Bourg (N =79)	.000	.020	.096	.164	.179
Managers (N = 283)	.003	.028	.021	.137	.144
Supervisors (N = 78)	.031	.015	.087	.090	.125
Professionals (N = 107)	.003	.008	.028	.151	.199
Workers (N=419)	.020	.024	.021	.064	.106

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05 (two-tailed tests); GFI = .99; Chi-Square = 85.64; df = 78; prob. = .26

^a Relationship not in model

The next column demonstrates that older managers and older workers are more likely to be satisfied with their jobs. In respect to income, the petty bourgeoisie of color and managers of color are significantly more likely to have lower household incomes. Likewise, women workers tend to have lower incomes. The correlation between age and race that is illustrated in Figure 2 is only significant for the managers (not reported). On average, managers of color are slightly younger than the white managers.

The participation and control results are of most interest here. First, younger capitalists are more supportive of participation. The older bourgeoisie probably came of age during the height of scientific management and continue to be opposed to the quite opposite notion of worker participation. Workers of color are more supportive of participation than whites. This coincides with the underdog thesis. Female petty bourgeoisie and female managers are also more likely to support worker participation than their male counterparts. Since participation is irrelevant for the self-employed women, this may be a residual of other effects. These data indicate that the greatest gender gap in pay occurs within the petty bourgeoisie. So, the self-employed women's support may partially reflect the negative effects of income subordination.

Female managers are more likely to support worker participation (specifically in the election of managers such as themselves) perhaps because they are subordinated in comparison to their male counterparts. It is likely that these women have climbed the ranks and have become disillusioned as they receive less power, less respect, and less pay than men do for the same work (Reskin and Padavic 1994). They apparently have more confidence in workers' abilities to rectify these disparities than capital's. Moreover, Hegelsen (1990) argues that in general, female managers have a distinctive leadership style which makes them more likely to support workplace democracy (see also Collom 2000).

What is surprising is that female workers are not more supportive than male workers. The underdog argument suggests that they should be. The lack of gender effects among workers may reflect socialization processes in which women are encouraged to subordinate their needs to others (see Mitchell 1975). So, as managers, women may want to be more in touch with their workers' needs, while as workers, women may subordinate their own needs to those of their managers.

In respect to political identification, liberal managers and liberal professionals are more likely to support worker participation. Conservative managers do not want to be elected by their subordinates while the liberal ones are more open to the idea and might feel that it

may improve the efficiency of the firm. The lack of support of conservative professionals may simply reflect their particular conservatism since worker participation does not affect them. Workers who are less satisfied with their jobs are more supportive of participation. This resonates nicely with the underdog thesis. Finally, in respect to participation, lower income capitalists and managers are more supportive of participation. If lower incomes are any reflection of the viability and strength of the enterprises of which these capitalists own and these managers work, they may feel that worker participation might improve their firm's efficiency. At the personal level, it could be that affluent capital and its managers are less supportive because they see participation as directly threatening to their livelihood.

Last are the results for the ultimate dependent variable in the model, worker control. Professionals of color are more supportive of worker control than their white counterparts. Surprisingly, none of the other classes have significant racial effects in respect to control. These professionals of color may particularly appreciate the autonomy and decision making power their jobs afford. Given their own struggles within the system (and the fact that worker control would not substantively affect them), professionals of color may support worker control because it is anti-capital.⁷ Female supervisors and female professionals are also found to be more supportive of worker control. The female supervisors are likely to see how subordinated they are compared to their male counterparts and therefore may see worker control as a remedy. As in the case of professionals of color, female professionals have also probably had to struggle to reach their positions. This experience may have fostered some antagonism toward capital and its managers along the way—thus facilitating support for worker control as a counter.

As in the case of participation, workers who are less satisfied with their jobs are more supportive of worker control. Finally, the effect of participation upon control for the various classes can be considered. This relationship was significant for all except the supervisors. Indeed, there is only one significant relationship in the entire supervisor model. Apart from the effect of being female, supervisors are apparently uniformly unsupportive of control.


The capitalist's model explains the most variance in attitudes toward participation while the professional's model explains the most variance in attitudes toward control. Conversely, the worker's model explains the least amount of variance in respect to both worker

⁷ Alternatively, these employees may be interpreting the workplace democracy questions in a fashion that includes their own situation, not just *workers* who lack their advantages.

participation and worker control. It is expected that this is because the effect of union membership is not accounted for in this model. The regression analyses indicated that the union variable was the single most important in those models. However, the comparability that the stacked models offers required that the union variable be excluded from that analysis. Since workplace democracy is presumably mostly in the interests of workers, this analysis is concluded by estimating a separate path model for workers alone.

Along with the union variable, sector and organizational size⁸ were also significant in the worker-only model. After theoretically identifying the nature of each variable (independent, intervening, or dependent), the best-fit model was identified through an exploratory analysis. Figure 3 provides the results.

Figure 3. Standardized Path Coefficients for Workers' Model of Determinants of Attitudes toward Workplace Democracy



GFI = .99; Chi-square = 24.40; df = 22; prob. = .33; N = 394

Notes. Standardized path coefficients are located near the head of the arrows and the variance explained for each intervening and dependent variable is located outside of the upper-right hand corner of the boxes. All paths are significant ($p < .05$; two-tailed tests).

As the “stacked” worker model indicates (see Table 4), political identification and income are not significant in predicting workers’ attitudes toward participation and control (so they do not appear in this model). Sector, organizational size, and union membership are each important additions to the model. The standardized coefficients indicate that workers of color are significantly more likely to work in the

⁸ As a control variable, organizational size was not a significant predictor in the regression analyses. Thus, it was excluded there.

governmental/non-profit sector and to work in larger organizations. Moreover, workers in the governmental/non-profit sector are more likely to be employed in larger work organizations. Women workers are less likely to be union members and workers who labor within larger organizations are more likely to be unionized. Workers from the government/non-profit sector are significantly more satisfied with their jobs (as are older workers). Unionized workers are significantly less satisfied with their jobs than non-unionized workers.

As the earlier stacked worker model illustrated, workers of color are significantly more supportive of worker participation. Job satisfaction and union membership are at the center of this model as they have the strongest influence (and the strongest theoretical connections as well). Job satisfaction has direct negative effects on both participation and control as those who are less satisfied with their jobs are significantly more supportive of workplace democracy. Likewise, union members are significantly more supportive of both participation and control. The negative effect of job satisfaction is slightly stronger than the positive effect of unionization on attitudes toward worker participation. The inverse is true for the case of worker control.

The relationship between union membership, job satisfaction, and attitudes toward workplace democracy matches theoretical expectations. First, union membership is a major source of differentiation within the working class. Unions are an important source of class consciousness and union members are consistently more class conscious than nonmembers (Leggett 1968; Form 1985). Second, as Freeman and Medoff (1984) explain, union members are consistently less satisfied with their working conditions. Rather than translating into exit options, such dissatisfaction leads to the expression of discontent and actions to improve working conditions. In this case, workers' union membership and dissatisfaction with their jobs leads to greater support for worker participation in decision making and worker control.

Summary and Conclusions

Now the data analysis can be summarized in order to reiterate the major findings and reinforce the logic of this research design. Given the cross-class support for workplace democracy and the varied indicators of class posited by sociologists, the effects of a variety of class criteria were systematically tested (net of the control variables) on attitudes toward worker participation and control (see Tables 2 and 3). The results clearly indicate that the production-related criteria of class are salient in explaining these attitudes. Since capitalism's class experience is holistic, and not encountered in unrelated bits and pieces, a class location variable

was constructed that was informed by the criteria results and more accurately reflects people's work lives.

The independent effects of class location were tested through an adjusted means analysis that permits substantive comparisons (see Figure 1). These results suggest that the issue is quite complex. That is, significant cross-class support does exist for attitudes toward both worker participation and worker control. This lack of class differences implies that the causal mechanisms may operate differently for different classes. Therefore, a path model was estimated separately for each class location.

The baseline path model better reflects social reality, illustrating that various intervening variables exist (see Figure 2). The stacked path analysis estimates the model for each of the class locations. These results confirm that the relationships within the model vary wildly across the various class locations (see Table 4). Younger capitalists, female petty bourgeoisie and managers, lower income capitalists and managers, liberal managers and professionals, workers of color, and workers who are dissatisfied with their jobs are the most supportive of worker participation within their respective classes.

Professionals of color, female supervisors and professionals, and dissatisfied workers are most supportive of worker control within their respective classes. Moreover, for everyone except the supervisors, support for worker participation is also a significant necessary precondition of support for worker control. This "hierarchy of support" coincides with Greenberg's (1986) "theory of escalation" and the "spillover" arguments (see Pateman 1970; Bachrach and Botwinick 1992). Worker participation is likely to give people a thirst for more radical transformations such as worker control.

Following the comparative stacked models, a final path model was estimated for workers (see Figure 3). The causal dynamics for this model are quite different than those for the baseline (non-class) model. Most importantly, unionized workers and workers who are dissatisfied with their jobs are significantly more supportive of both worker participation and worker control.

A major premise of this paper is that capitalists, managers, and workers have all supported workplace democracy for one reason or another. Such cross-class support is confirmed by these analyses. While workers are expected to be favorable toward workplace democracy, the puzzle is to figure out why other classes are also supportive. These findings indicate that the advocacy of workplace democracy from outside of the working class derives primarily from those who are

subordinated within their own classes. Most significantly, gender is the most important basis of the “middle class” support (petty bourgeoisie, managers, supervisors, and professionals). This resonates with Barrera’s (1979) class segmentation prediction that *within* classes there exists opposing class interests. Compared to men, “middle class” women are subordinated within their respective classes and it is likely that they support workplace democracy as a means of improving the intra-class disparities they encounter. This finding also coincides with previous research documenting that gender is a more salient basis of subordination within classes than race.⁹

Inside the working class, as expected, the most class conscious workers—union members—and the most alienated—dissatisfied—workers are the most supportive of workplace democracy. Overall, workplace democracy is predominantly supported by those who are aware of and/or those who are disproportionately suffering from capitalism’s relations. This clearly suggests that the cross-class support is illusory. The non-working class advocates represent the desires of particular class segments. Overall, capital and its managers are not supportive of workplace democracy. As some have argued (Fantasia, Clawson, and Graham 1988; Parker and Slaughter 1994; see also Nissen 1997), their contemporary rhetoric surrounding workplace transformation appears to be merely a veiled attempt to further their most urgent goal—the accumulation of capital.

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⁹ Greater intra-class disparities by gender have been documented in respect to income (Wright 1979); supervisory authority (McGuire and Reskin 1993; Reskin and Padavic 1994), and job autonomy (Jaffee 1989; Adler 1993).

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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics

	<i>N</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Skewness</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>
<i>Dependent Variables</i>							
Participation	1166	0	6	3.36	1.76	-.46	.07
Control	1166	0	10	2.67	2.13	.75	.07
<i>Class Variables</i>							
Income	1132	1	10	4.77	2.43	.52	.07
Wealth	1166	0	1	.08	.27	3.11	.07
Poverty	1166	0	1	.03	.17	5.52	.07
SEI	1162	1	5	2.65	1.32	.31	.07
Education	1165	1	4	2.80	.93	-.10	.07
Skill	1166	0	1	.33	.47	.74	.07
Expert	1166	0	1	.06	.25	3.56	.07
Prof/Technical	1156	0	1	.20	.40	1.50	.07
Unskilled W-C	1166	0	1	.28	.45	.96	.07
Skilled W-C	1166	0	1	.06	.23	3.84	.07
Unskilled B-C	1166	0	1	.09	.29	2.87	.07
Skilled B-C	1166	0	1	.17	.38	1.76	.07
Owner	1166	0	1	.09	.28	2.96	.07
Petty Owner	1166	0	1	.08	.27	3.11	.07
Authority1	1166	0	1	.08	.26	3.24	.07
Authority2	1166	0	1	.26	.44	1.07	.07
Decisions1	1166	0	1	.40	.49	.41	.07
Decisions2	1166	0	1	.14	.35	2.08	.07
Autonomy	1166	0	1	.13	.34	2.21	.07
Subjective UMC	1166	0	1	.10	.30	2.68	.07
Subjective MC	1166	0	1	.64	.48	-.57	.07
Subjective WC	1166	0	1	.25	.43	1.18	.07
<i>Control Variables</i>							
Age	1156	18	80	38.30	12.30	.66	.07
Woman	1166	0	1	.50	.50	-.01	.07
Minority	1106	0	1	.15	.36	1.97	.07
Sector	1166	0	1	.25	.43	1.18	.07
Job Satisfaction	1163	1	5	4.02	.95	-.91	.07
Political ID	1153	1	7	4.29	1.25	-.03	.07
Union	1166	0	1	.14	.35	2.10	.07
Organizational Size	964	1	4	2.37	.90	.25	.08

Variable Descriptions*Dependent Variables*

PARTICIPATION: This simple additive scale was constructed from two items. The first item asks whether or not people agree that all employees in a work organization like theirs should have an equal voice in choosing the director and top managers of the company. The second item is directly related and asks respondents whether they feel that if all employees did participate in this fashion would the organization become

more or less efficient. This measure ranges from 0 to 6 and has good reliability (Cronbach's alpha = .830).

CONTROL: This simple additive scale was constructed from ten items. Respondents were asked how much influence they thought that management and nonmanagement employees should have over ten decisions in the workplace. They were asked to choose whether the following decisions should be made *mainly* by management or *mainly* by employees who are not part of management: how much time employees can take for lunch breaks, what time employees should arrive/leave work, who is assigned to work overtime and how much, which employees carry out different tasks, who introduces new technology, who decides about the appropriate discipline for various problems, who introduces new ways of organizing work, who decides about making changes in the products or services, who decides about the pay levels for different jobs, and who decides about lay-off policies. The resulting measure ranges from 0 to 10 and has fair reliability (Cronbach's alpha = .671).

Class Variables

INCOME is an interval variable based upon the respondent's annual household income. It was recoded into ten categories (ranging from less than \$10,000 to \$90,000 and above) since the distribution of the original item was highly positively skewed and had "peakedness" problems (large kurtosis statistic).

WEALTH is a dummy variable that identifies those respondents from households who received 10% or more of their previous year's income from investment interest and/or rent from buildings or land.

POVERTY is a dummy variable that identifies those respondents from households that received public assistance such as AFDC and food stamps in the previous year.

SEI is Duncan's socio-economic index. It was recoded into five categories (each containing nine scores) ranging from lower status to upper status due to the original scale's positive skewness.

EDUCATION is an ordinal variable containing four categories: "not a high school graduate," "high school graduate," "some college," and "college graduate."

SKILL is a dummy variable identifying those who are employed in skilled occupations (see Wright 1997: 82; Table 2.4 - "Skill-3" column).

EXPERT is a dummy variable identifying those who are employed in “expert” occupations (see Wright 1997: 82; Table 2.4 - “Skill-3” column).

OCCUPATION is a six-category variable constructed from the 1980 Census of Population Occupation Codes (see Wright 1997: 82). The groups are: managers, professional/technical, unskilled white-collar, skilled white-collar, unskilled blue-collar, and skilled blue-collar. Dummy variables for each group were created (managers were omitted as the baseline).

OWNER is a dummy variable that identifies those respondents who are self-employed and have employees working for them.

PETTY OWNER is a dummy variable that identifies those respondents who are self-employed and have no employees working for them.

AUTHORITY1 is a dummy variable that identifies “nominal” and “task” supervisors. These employees supervise the work of others and are usually responsible for deciding the specific work tasks and procedures of their subordinates (see Wright 1985: 306-11).

AUTHORITY2 is a dummy variable that identifies “sanctioning” supervisors. These employees have all of the abilities of the nominal and task supervisors and also have the power to do at least one of the following: grant pay raises, prevent pay raises, fire or suspend employees, or issue formal warnings (see Wright 1985: 306-11).

DECISIONS1 is a dummy variable that identifies employees who personally provide advice to the decision makers regarding major company decisions (see Wright 1985: 305-09).

DECISIONS2 is a dummy variable that identifies employees who are personally involved in making major company decisions (see Wright 1985: 305-09).

AUTONOMY is a dummy variable that identifies those employees who reported that it is “fairly hard” or “very hard” for someone in authority to check on their work *and* that their work is actually checked on “less than once a week” or “never.”

SUBJECTIVE CLASS is a four-category nominal variable in which respondents identified themselves as belonging to one of the following: “working class,” “middle class,” “upper-middle class,” and “upper class.” Dummy variables for each group were created (the “upper class” were omitted as the baseline).

CLASS LOCATION is a six-category nominal variable constructed from several of the previously described dummy variables. OWNERS are “capitalists” and PETTY OWNERS are “petty bourgeoisie.” The “sanctioning” supervisors (AUTHORITY2) are “managers” while the “nominal” and “task” supervisors (AUTHORITY1) are “supervisors.” The professional/technical workers (from OCCUPATION) who do not meet any of the previous four criteria are “professionals.” Finally, those employees who do not meet any of the preceding five criteria are “workers.”

Control Variables

AGE is a continuous variable that ranges from 18 to 80.

GENDER is a dummy coded variable with women coded “1.”

RACE is a dummy coded variable with “1” capturing people of color (African Americans and Latinos).

SECTOR is a dummy coded variable which identifies those respondent who are employed by the government or a non-profit organization (as opposed to a private company).

JOB SATISFACTION is a five-point scale in which respondents were asked to rate how much they like their jobs. “1” is “I hate my job” and “5” is “I love my job.”

POLITICAL IDENTIFICATION is a seven-point scale in which respondents were asked to rate their political beliefs. “1” is “extremely liberal,” “7” is “extremely conservative,” and “4” is the “midpoint.”

UNION is a dummy coded variable which identifies current union members.

ORGANIZATIONAL SIZE is the size of the respondent’s work organization. It is an ordinal variable with four categories (less than 10, between 10 and 100, between 101 and 1000, and more than 1000 people).¹

¹ Ideally this would be a continuous measure of the actual number of employees. Unfortunately, a large number of the respondents stated that they “didn’t know” the number of employees at their workplace. These people were then given the choice of the four fixed category options. Thus, for this variable, the actual numeric responses were collapsed into the four fixed categories.